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TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ROGER H. DUSBERGER*
During its 1979-80 term, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit issued opinions in six environmental cases, certain
of which may be expected to have a profound future impact on this
ever expanding area of the law. The primary issues addressed in these
decisions involved the federal common law of nuisance governing pol-
lution, I state intervention in a federal enforcement action, 2 federal reg-
ulation of intrastate dredge and fill activities, 3 and the attainment
designation process 4 and state implementation planning process5 under
the Clean Air Act.
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE REVISITED AND ENLARGED
During its previous term, the Seventh Circuit held that the federal
common law of nuisance was not preempted by the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act6 and that the FWPCA did not limit the relief which
may be granted in a nuisance action.7 During its 1979-80 term, the
Seventh Circuit revisited this area of the law, issuing what appear to be
two landmark decisions which substantially enlarge and render more
comprehensive the federal common law of nuisance governing inci-
dents of pollution.
* Assistant General Counsel, Peoples Energy Corporation, Chicago, Illinois; B.S., J.D.,
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Illinois; L.L.M., George Washington University,
Washington, D.C.
I. City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 689 (1980); Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980) (first
of two consolidated appeals).
2. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp. 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980) (second appeal).
3. United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
4. United States Steel Corp., v. USEPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
710, reh. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1332 (1980).
5. Illinois v. USEPA, 621 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1980).
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1593-96 (1977), constitute the keystone of water pollution law today. Sec-
tion 2 of the 1977 Act provides that while the Federal Water Pollution Control Act still may be
cited, the full regulatory scheme is to be "commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act." How-
ever, since the Seventh Circuit referred almost exclusively in its 1979-80 term environmental deci-
sions to the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act," the abbreviation FWPCA is used hereinafter.
7. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). See Harrison, Environmental Law.-
The Growth and Evolution of Rights and Liabilities, 56 CH.-KENT L. REV. 255, 273-77 (1979).
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City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc.
City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc.,8 involved an
appeal from a district court dismissal of a damage suit brought by three
Indiana municipal corporations9 which arose out of the defendants' al-
leged pollution of the Ohio River from Kentucky. The primary ques-
tion on appeal was whether the plaintiffs stated a claim over which the
district court had jurisdiction. 10 The Seventh Circuit held that they had
stated a valid claim under the federal common law of nuisance and that
the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331." l The dis-
trict court's decision was affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded
in part for further proceedings on the nuisance issue.
The plaintiffs alleged that Kentucky Recycling had discharged
toxic chemicals into the sewer system of the co-defendant sewage dis-
trict, and that the district had in turn discharged them into the Ohio
River, from which the plaintiffs drew drinking water. The plaintiffs
further alleged that as a result of these discharges they incurred unu-
sual water treatment expenses. They sought to recover those expenses
and sought punitive damages as well. The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' amended complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction.
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that jurisdiction existed on three
separate grounds: (1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 relative to rights of ac-
tion implied under (a) section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act,12 (b)
the FWPCA, and (c) the Safe Drinking Water Act; 13 (2) under the citi-
zen suit provisions of the latter two statutes; and (3) under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 relative to a right of action under the federal common law of
nuisance.
The Seventh Circuit first addressed the issue of whether section 13
of the Rivers and Harbors Act created either an implied or an express
private right of action. The court held that it did not. In reaching this
result, the Seventh Circuit began with the principle that "when Con-
8. 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 689 (1980).
9. The plaintiffs were Evansville, Indiana, Evansville's water department, and Mount
Vernon, Indiana. The defendants were Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., three of its employees,
and a local sewage district.
10. 604 F.2d at 1010.
I1. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000. ... and arises under the . . . laws
• ..of the United States.
(The $10,000 jurisdictional amount was eliminated on Dec. I, 1980 by the Federal Question Juris-
dictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980).)
12. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f, 300g, 300h, 300i, 300j (1976).
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gress does not expressly create a private cause of action, an intent to do
so is not lightly to be inferred."' 4 The court noted recent Supreme
Court decisions' 5 which had established a stricter standard for the im-
plication of private causes of action 16 than that previously enunciated
by the Court.'
7
Having thus acknowledged the need for a conservative approach,
the Seventh Circuit considered the factors set forth by the Supreme
Court in Conl v. Ash,' 8 for determining whether a private remedy is
implicit in a federal statute not expressly providing one. In so doing,
the court found that section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act appeared
to benefit the public at large, rather than a class of municipalities such
as the plaintiffs or their agents; that the legislative history cited by the
parties was inconclusive; that the statutory framework of the Act sug-
gested a congressional intent to grant primary enforcement authority to
the Department of Justice rather than to create private rights of action;
and that although traditionally such a cause of action as presented in
this case has been left to state law, the area is not primarily the concern
of the states. 19
The Seventh Circuit next focused its attention on the plaintiffs'
contention that private rights of action existed under the FWPCA to
support their claims. It first considered their argument that an express
right existed under the citizen suit authority in section 505 of the
FWPCA.20  But, since the plaintiffs failed to give the statutorily re-
quired notice before filing their action, the Seventh Circuit, in agree-
ment with the district court, held that their reliance on section 505 was
misplaced.
2'
14. 604 F.2d at 1011.
15. Id, citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Shiffrin v. Bratton, 443
U.S. 903 (1979). See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
16. 604 F.2d at 1011, citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
17. See J.1. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
18. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The four factors enunciated in Cori were: (1) whether the plaintiff
was part of a class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted, (2) whether the legislative
intent appears to create or deny a federal right in favor of the plaintiff, (3) whether the purported
private right is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme (statutory frame-
work), and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law in an area
basically reserved to the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a solely federal right. Id.
at 78.
19. 604 F.2d at 1012.
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976). Section 505 creates private rights of action for certain FWPCA
violations, conditioned upon the service of 60 days advance notice upon the alleged violator, the
United States Environmental Protection Agency, and the affected state, before such action may be
commenced.
21. The court of appeals said in dicta that, even if the requisite notice had been given, section
505 would not have authorized the plaintiffs' claim because it only allows citizen actions for al-
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The citizen suit provisions of the FWPCA having thus been held
inapplicable, the Seventh Circuit next considered whether any other
right of action existed under the FWPCA to support the plaintiffs'
claims. The court found that there was none. Noting that the plaintiffs
failed to rely upon any particular provision of the Act, the court looked
to section 301,22 which proscribes the discharge of any pollutant except
in conformity with the requirements of the FWPCA. The court then
returned to the four factors stated in Cort v. Ash to determine whether a
private right of action could be implied under section 301.
The Seventh Circuit found an absence of any congressional intent
to confer private rights of action upon particular classes of persons or
to authorize rights additional to the citizen suit authority in section
505.23 Rather, it perceived the existence of 505 as demonstrating an
intent to carefully channel public participation in the enforcement of
the FWPCA, since that section requires advance notice and allows in-
tervention if adequate government enforcement proceedings are filed.
24
The court felt that the legislative history of 505 suggested that rights of
action for money damages must be found outside the FWPCA. 25 It
further determined that a private right of action under section 301
would be inconsistent with the congressional purpose implicit in the
FWPCA's statutory framework, which encourages public participation
in enforcement through the citizen action provisions of section 505.26
Moreover, it found the FWPCA's general enforcement scheme to be
adequate. 27 It, therefore, held that the plaintiffs had not stated a claim
under the FWPCA on which relief could be granted.
The Seventh Circuit next addressed the asserted existence of pri-
vate rights of action and citizen suit authority under the Safe Drinking
Water Act.28 However, it declined to undertake a detailed analysis of
this argument, finding that with an exception not relevant here, the Act
does not purport to regulate pollutant discharges, but instead attempts
to insure that public water systems provide drinking water meeting
minimal safety standards. 29 Thus, the court of appeals could find no
leged present violations, that is, actions against persons "alleged to be in violation" of an effluent
limitation, standard or administrative order, and does not authorize actions for past violations or
the recovery of damages. 604 F.2d at 1014.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).
23. 604 F.2d at 1015.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1016.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f, 300g, 300h, 300i, 300j (1976).
29. 604 F.2d at 1016. A public water system is defined in pertinent part by the Act to be "a
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provision in the Act into which the defendants' alleged discharges even
arguably fell.
30
After determining that no cause of action existed under the Safe
Drinking Water Act, the Seventh Circuit considered plaintiffs' final
claim to a right of action under the federal common law of nuisance
and to the existence of federal jurisdiction over such an action under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. It upheld both contentions. In so doing, the court inter-
preted the common law doctrine of nuisance governing pollution, for-
mulated by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee,3 1 as extending
to municipal or public corporations in actions for money damages. In
that decision, the Supreme Court held that states have rights of action
under federal common law for the abatement of pollution of interstate
or navigable waters.
32
The district court in City of Evansville had strictly interpreted the
decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee as being limited to states in actions to
abate pollution, not to municipal corporations seeking money dam-
ages.3 3 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit conceded in Evansville that the
plaintiffs were not seeking to represent the quasi-sovereign or ecologi-
cal rights of the State of Indiana, but rather sought only to recover
damages for the defendants' discharges of toxic chemicals into their
drinking water supplies. 34 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs, liberally interpreting the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Illinois v. Milwaukee. The court of appeals concluded that
the same reasons the Supreme Court found compelling when it formu-
lated the nuisance doctrine were equally present where plaintiffs are
public or municipal corporations which are required to spend public
monies to eradicate the effects of pollution caused by acts performed in
another state.
35
The Seventh Circuit found particularly persuasive the Court's ob-
servation in Illinois v. Milwaukee that federal common law has been
fashioned "where there is an overriding federal interest in the need for
a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic inter-
system for the provision to the public of piped water for human consumption. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300f(4) (1976).
30. 604 F.2d at 1016.
31. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). It should be noted that this case has no relation to the 7th Circuit
decision, Illinois v. Milwaukee, referred to in note 7 and accompanying text supra.
32. Id. at 99. Illinois v. Milwaukee involved the alleged discharge of pollutants by the City of
Milwaukee into the interstate waters of Lake Michigan, and its resultant effect on Illinois.
33. 604 F.2d at 1017.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1018.
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ests of federalism." 36 Implicit in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in City
of Evansville is the conclusion that similar federal interests exist in the
pollution of the Ohio River, as the Supreme Court found to exist in the
pollution of Lake Michigan.
37
Addressing the nature of the relief requested, the Seventh Circuit
considered, but rejected, the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs'
request for damages rather than injunctive relief precluded the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction. 38 The court found no authority for this
position and could find nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion in Illi-
nois v. Milwaukee that would establish a request for equitable relief as
a requisite for maintaining a claim under the federal common law of
interstate water pollution or that would support the conclusion that eq-
uitable relief is exclusive to a claim of that nature.39 Moreover, the
court pointed out that the relief sought by a litigant is not ordinarily
determinative of whether he has a cause of action, this question being
"analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a
litigant may be entitled to receive ... .
City of Evansville is significant for several reasons. The Seventh
Circuit at once enlarged the federal common law of nuisance well be-
yond the factual basis on which the doctrine had been formulated by
the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee. Not only was the doctrine
interpreted by the court of appeals as extending beyond the states to
municipal or public corporate plaintiffs, but also the nature of the rem-
edy available was extended beyond actions to abate nuisances to those
for money damages. While the Seventh Circuit's decision thus extends
the Supreme Court's statement of federal common law in Illinois v. Mil-
waukee, it nevertheless appears to be a natural extension of it, given
that problems of interstate pollution appear to present federal questions
upon which state statutes or decisions may not be conclusive,4' regard-
less of the character of the parties or the nature of the relief sought.
This decision is but one step removed from the further extension of the
doctrine to private party plaintiffs.
4 2
36. Id. at 1017-18, citing 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
37. See 604 F.2d at 1018.
38. Id. at 1019.
39. Id. at n.32. Cf. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1972), in which the Supreme
Court described suits under the federal common law of nuisance as follows: "[F]ederal courts will
be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water
pollution. . . .[T]hese will be equity suits in which the judgment of the chancellor will largely
govern."
40. 604 F.2d at 1019, citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).
41. See 604 F.2d at 1017, citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 105.
42. See Note, Federal Common Law andInterstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1972).
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City of Evansville is also important for the court's analyses of im-
plied rights of action and citizen suit authority under federal statutes.
Indeed, it may well have been the court's finding of the inapplicability
of these statutes that sparked its efforts to enlarge the federal common
law of nuisance.
Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp.
Later in its 1979-80 term, the Seventh Circuit again had occasion
to consider the common law of nuisance and used the occasion to fur-
ther enlarge the doctrine. In Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp.,43 the
first of two consolidated appeals, 44 the court held that a state has a
federal common law cause of action for nuisance against an in-state
pollution source to prevent pollution of interstate or navigable waters.
45
It construed the term "navigable waters" as consisting of "both the ter-
ritorial seas and purely intrastate waters having no necessary interstate
impact, ' 46 including "tributaries" of such waters. 47 The Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case.
Outboard Marine was an appeal from a district court dismissal of
an action for injunctive relief and civil penalties by the State of Illinois
against Outboard Marine Corporation. 4 The state alleged in its com-
plaint that OMC had discharged highly toxic polychlorinated biphe-
nyls49 from its Illinois manufacturing facility into Waukegan Harbor, a
tributary of Lake Michigan, and into Lake Michigan, causing contami-
nation at levels that damaged water quality and bird life, threatened
the health and welfare of Illinois residents, and impaired the usefulness
of the lake as a public water supply and place of recreation. 50 The
action was founded essentially upon the federal common law of nui-
sance and the FWPCA. The complaint sought injunctive relief to re-
strain OMC from further PCB discharges and to require it to study,
remove, and dispose of PCB contaminated sediments and soil. The
complaint also sought civil penalties.
The district court dismissed the State's complaint despite finding
that federal jurisdiction existed for the nuisance count. It held that the
count failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because
43. 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980).
44. The second appeal will be discussed at text accompanying notes 87-99 infra.
45. 619 F.2d at 623-24.
46. Id. at 627.
47. Id. at 628.
48. Hereinafter referred to as OMC.
49. Hereinafter referred to as PCBs.
50. 619 F.2d at 624.
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the case involved a controversy between two Illinois residents and be-
cause there was no allegation of injury to, or from, another state. 5' As
to the FWPCA claim, the district court held it had no jurisdiction, since
Illinois had not given the required sixty days notice to the United
States Environmental Protection Agency 52 or the defendant. 53 The
state appealed.
Reversing the lower court's ruling, the Seventh Circuit based its
decision on the "broad policy considerations" 54 expressed by the
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee. 55 As in City of Evansville, the
court of appeals again found persuasive the Supreme Court's observa-
tion that federal common law has been fashioned "when there is an
overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or
where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism. ' 56 Re-
sponding to this, the Seventh Circuit in Outboard Marine specifically
found that "[t]he nation has a basic overriding federal interest in inter-
state and navigable waters and in developing a uniform program of
protecting these national resources from pollution." 57 This interest, it
said, had been made explicit by the FWPCA.
58
The Seventh Circuit next defined the scope of the federal interest
so identified, based upon its interpretation of the Supreme Court's in-
tent in Illinois v. Milwaukee. It noted that the Supreme Court had
placed no significance on the fact that the pollution involved there
came from an out-of-state source. 59 It also noted the Court's observa-
tion that federal common law applies when dealing with air and water
in their "ambient or interstate aspects."'60 However, central to the
Supreme Court's decision, in the opinion of the Seventh Circuit, were
the Court's repeated expressions of intent "to extend the application of
the federal common law to public nuisances caused by the pollution of
either 'interstate or navigable waters.' "61 The Supreme Court's use of
the term "navigable waters," with all of its "implications," was per-
ceived by the Seventh Circuit as being not just a "careless . . . choice
51. Id.
52. Hereinafter referred to as the USEPA.
53. Section 505 of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976), authorizes citizens suits for certain
violations of the FWPCA on the condition that no such suit be commenced absent 60 days ad-
vance notice to the USEPA, the state in which the violation occurred, and the alleged violator.
54. 619 F.2d at 626.
55. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
56. 619 F.2d at 625, citing 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.




61. Id. (emphasis added).
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of words,"' 62 but rather a significant suggestion of the breadth of its
holding.6
3
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, construed the term "navigable wa-
ters" to apply to "both the territorial seas and purely intrastate waters
having no necessary interstate impact, including tributaries of interstate
navigable waters." 64 It found support for this view in the FWPCA's
broad definition of the term,65 and in one of its own recent decisions
where it concluded that when applying the federal common law of nui-
sance, a court should look to the policies and principles of the Act for
guidance. 66 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court in
Illinois v. Milwaukee intended to provide more than a forum for con-
troversies between states; it intentionally "established, under federal
common law, a right in tort for the pollution of interstate and navigable
waters."
67
In delineating the relationship between federal and state interests
under the federal common law of nuisance, the Seventh Circuit in Out-
board Marine observed that federal concerns are not merely with navi-
gability but also with purity and quality of the waters, as indicated by
the expanded concept of "navigable waters" in the FWPCA. 68 The
court further acknowledged that states also have a clear interest in
clean water and, consistent with the national program of protecting
federal waters, they should be "allowed to sue one who has committed
the federal tort of polluting federal waters within a state or on which
the state borders. ' 69 It admonished, however, that federal law governs,
and that it should be uniform.
70
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Reserve Mining Co. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency 7' and Committee for Consideration of Jones
Falls Sewage System v. Train,72 two court of appeals cases which held
that the federal common law should not be applied to intrastate pollu-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 626-27.
64. Id. at 627. The court also found that tributaries of interstate navigable waters should be
included. Id. at 628.
65. Id. at 627 n. 14.
66. 619 F.2d at 627, citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 164 (7th Cir. 1979). Addi-
tional support was found in the legislative history of the FWPCA, which had been interpreted as
indicating a congressional intention to give the term "navigable waters" the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation. 619 F.2d at 627 n.14.




71. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
72. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
tion of navigable waters. 73 The court noted that while these cases in-
volved purely intrastate pollution, the difference in Outboard Marine
was that all states bordering on Lake Michigan were affected, although
only one, Illinois, had sued OMC. 74 However, after drawing this dis-
tinction, the Seventh Circuit held that it was not controlling. It relied
instead upon its interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding in Illi-
nois v. Milwaukee, as not being restricted to interstate disputes.75 The
court further relied upon certain other decisions which it felt ap-
proached the "edge of the question. '76 It reasoned that "[forbidding
Illinois to invoke federal nuisance law [in Outboard Marine] would cre-
ate the anomaly that three states bordering Lake Michigan may sue to
prevent pollution emanating from Illinois, but Illinois itself may not
bring such an action."
77
Clearly, the Seventh Circuit's determination of the first appeal in
Outboard Marine is very significant and may be expected to have far-
reaching effects. The court construed the doctrine of a federal common
law of nuisance governing pollution, as applying both to in-state parties
and in-state pollution. In reaching this result, it characterized as "fed-
eral waters" all interstate or navigable intrastate waters, including terri-
torial seas, and waters having no necessary interstate impact and their
tributaries. It found an overriding federal interest in protecting these
waters from pollution, the practical significance of which it described as
follows:
When a pollution controversy arises, it is immaterial whether there is
a showing of extra-territorial pollution effects. The issue is whether
73. 619 F.2d at 628. In Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d
492 (8th Cir. 1975), the Eighth Circuit rejected a common law nuisance claim in a Minnesota case
involving intrastate air pollution. In Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v.
Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976), the Fourth Circuit reached a similar result in a case involv-
ing the alleged pollution of an intrastate waterway.
74. 619 F.2d at 629.
75. Id.
76. Id, citing Stream Pollution Control Board v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036
(7th Cir. 1975), in which the Seventh Circuit held that the complaint stated federal questions in a
situation involving the attempt by an Indiana administrative body to use federal common law to
abate pollution of an Indiana tributary to Lake Michigan; United States ex rel. Scott v. United
States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. 111. 1973), in which the district court upheld a joint
federal and State of Illinois action brought under the federal common law of nuisance to prohibit
pollutant discharges into Lake Michigan, while noting the federal government's "undoubted right
to . . . protect the navigable waters from pollution." Id. at 558; United States v. Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972), aff'dmem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974), affirming the district court's refusal to dismiss the federal government's claim
under the federal common law of nuisance, despite the fact that the government's complaint failed
to allege an interstate pollutant effect. The district court in Bushey & Sons said that the federal
government may sue to protect the "national interest in the quality of air and water in their ambi-
ent or interstate aspects." 346 F. Supp. at 149.
77. 619 F.2d at 629.
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the dispute is a matter of federal concern. When it is, as in this case,
federal courts should be accessible. The effect of the federal common
law of nuisance is to fill the statutory interstices and to provide uni-
formity in controlling water pollution in either interstate or naviga-
ble waters or [sic] the United States. There is no strain on
federalism.
7 8
Outboard Marine thus builds upon City of Evansville, the two deci-
sions having potentially enormous significance in what may be the
evolution of the federal common law of nuisance governing pollution.
Read together, they tell us several things. First, while the federal inter-
est in pollution control is held to be an overriding one, federal, state
and local governments all are acknowledged to have a stake in such
control and may seek relief in federal court. Second, the relief sought
may be equitable or legal in nature. Third, the federal common law of
nuisance applies to water pollution which is interstate in nature, as well
as to that which affects purely navigable intrastate waters and their
tributaries. Fourth, while these decisions, and the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Illinois v. Milwaukee, all dealt with matters of water pollution,
there is nothing in them that would appear to deny the federal common
law of nuisance to situations involving other forms of pollution. And,
fifth, the reasoning employed seems clearly supportive of the further
application of the doctrine to suits brought by private parties.
One wonders what the eventual relationship will be between the
federal common law of nuisance, on the one hand, and federal environ-
mental statutory and regulatory law, on the other. The Supreme Court
in Illinois v. Milwaukee, decided in 1972, suggested that the federal
common law may in time be preempted by the federal statutory
scheme. 79 Since that time, however, a very comprehensive statutory
program has been enacted by Congress and, in large part, implemented
by USEPA and the states. Now, in 1980, the Seventh Circuit in Out-
board Marine tells us that the federal common law of nuisance will "fill
the statutory interstices and provide uniformity in controlling water
pollution."80 However, judging from the broad scope of these deci-
sions, as the doctrine continues to evolve, it may well become control-
ling.
The federal common law defined by Evansville and Outboard
Marine has the potential of developing into a judge-made system of
78. Id. at 630.
79. 406 U.S. 91. 107 (1972).
80. Id. As a practical matter, it should be noted that the problem in Outboard Marine was
not a "statutory interstice," but the plaintiffs' failure to give the required 60 days advance notice
for citizen suits under the FWPCA.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
pollution control separate and distinct from the federal statutory
scheme. As it develops, rules laid down by the courts may or may not
be uniform with those of the administrative planners. The Seventh
Circuit in these cases held only that the plaintiffs had stated claims
under the federal common law of nuisance. It did not determine
whether nuisances were proved to exist. This practical application of
the doctrine to the facts of each case was left to the district court. The
standards to be used by the district court in making these determina-
tions remain to be seen. The possibility obviously exists for judge-
made standards under the common law system either to be more or less
stringent than those set by USEPA or by state agencies. 8' One wonders
whether, in rendering decisions on common law nuisance claims,
judges will rely on administratively set standards promulgated under
the statutory framework or will set their own standards, based upon
supporting technical evidence admitted at trial, in deciding whether or
not a particular situation constitutes a nuisance? 82 It remains to be seen
how the technical evidence the courts consider will compare with the
technical data considered by federal and state agencies in setting envi-
ronmental standards and limitations. As to the direction the courts
may take, it is worth noting Justice Douglas's comment in Illinois v.
Milwaukee, concerning the nature of future common law actions for
nuisance: "There are no fixed rules that govern. . .; these will be eq-
uity suits in which the informed judgment of the chancellor will largely
govern."83
As a final note, one apparent inconsistency exists between the Sev-
enth Circuit's opinions in City of Evansville and Outboard Marine.
Comparing the language used by the two panels, it appears that in Ev-
ansville, the earlier of the two cases, the court interpreted the federal
common law of nuisance as being limited to incidents of interstate pol-
lution, while in Outboard Marine it interpreted the doctrine as ex-
81. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 175-77 (7th Cir. 1979), in which the Seventh
Circuit held that the FWPCA does not limit the relief that may be ordered under the federal
common law of nuisance, but further held that the evidence admitted in that case was sufficient
only to support part of the relief ordered (the elimination of overflows), and reversed as to the
remaining relief (requirement to upgrade the treatment level to better than secondary treatment).
82. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972), in which the Supreme Court seemed
to anticipate this problem, stating: "While federal law governs, consideration of state standards
may be relevant. . . . Thus, a State with high water-quality standards may well ask that its strict
standards be honored and that it not be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards
of a neighbor." In Outboard Marine, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court as having
envisioned a "uniform floor," whereby a state with pollution control standards more stringent
than those of a neighboring state could enforce those standards under the federal common law of
nuisance respecting interstate pollution. 619 F.2d at 628 n.16.
83. 406 U.S. at 107-08.
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tending to incidents of purely intrastate nature. On at least seven
occasions, the court identified the doctrine either as the "federal com-
mon law of nuisance governing interstate water pollution" or the "fed-
eral common law of interstate water pollution." 84 In four of those
instances,85 it attributed the doctrine, as so identified, to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Illinois v. Milwaukee. Consistent with the fact that
Evansville involved an interstate dispute, the Seventh Circuit's express
references to the doctrine appear to evidence a perception that, as for-
mulated by the Supreme Court, it applied only to interstate pollution.
Later, during the same term, the Seventh Circuit in Outboard Marine
referred to the doctrine as a "federal common law of nuisance," 86 and
specifically interpreted it as applicable to intrastate waters and their
tributaries. While the case involved the alleged pollution of Lake
Michigan, an interstate body of water, the court said that this fact was
not controlling. Interestingly, although the cases were rendered during
the same term of court, and both dealt with the federal common law of
nuisance, the court in Outboard Marine never cited its earlier decision
in Evansville.
STATE INTERVENTION IN FEDERAL ACTIONS
Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp.
The second appeal in Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp. involved a
district court denial of a motion by the State of Illinois to intervene in a
suit brought by the United States against OMC, for conduct similar to
that involved in the first appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and re-
manded, holding that the State had a right to intervene in the federal
suit.8
7
Coincident with the State suit involved in the first appeal, the
United States filed a complaint against OMC in the same district court,
also alleging PCB discharges into the same three water bodies. The
action was brought under the Refuse Act, 88 the FWPCA, and the fed-
eral common law of nuisance. The complaint sought to enjoin further
PCB contamination by requiring OMC to dredge and dispose of the
contaminated sediments, and further sought civil penalties. The case
was assigned to the same district judge as was handling the first suit.
84. See City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1017-19 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 689 (1980) (emphasis added).
85. See id. at 1017-18.
86. 619 F.2d at 625.
87. Id. at 624, 632.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
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The State of Illinois subsequently moved to intervene in the federal
action, contending in essence that a statutory right to intervene exists
under the citizen suit provisions of section 505(b)(1) of the FWPCA. 89
The district court denied the motion and the State appealed.
In support of its holding that intervention was proper, the court of
appeals first observed that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1),
allows intervention "when a statute of the United States confers an un-
conditional right to intervene." The court turned to section 505(b)(1)
of the FWPCA, which provides that "any citizen may intervene as a
matter of right" in any action which USEPA or a state is "diligently
prosecuting. . . to require compliance with [a] standard, limitation, or
[administrative] order" under the FWPCA.90 It construed the words
"citizen" in 505(b)(1) to mean a person having an affected interest, and
"person" to include a state. It further construed the terms "standard"
and "limitation" to include any unlawful act under section 301(a) of
the FWPCA, 91 the section which prohibits the discharge of any pollu-
tant absent compliance with the FWPCA. Finally, the court of appeals
observed that the United States had charged in its complaint that
OMC's continuing discharge of PCBs was not in compliance with the
permit issued to it under section 402 of the FWPCA, 92 and that, there-
fore, the discharge violated section 301(a). Pursuant to this line of rea-
soning, the court held that the requirements of section 505(b)(1) had
been met, and that the state was entitled to intervene as a matter of
right.
The Seventh Circuit then considered, but rejected, OMC's argu-
ment that no violation of section 301(a) could occur absent the inclu-
sion in OMC's NPDES permit of a standard or limitation promulgated
by USEPA.93 The court acknowledged that the appeal involved the
alleged violation of OMC's permit rather than a violation of a stan-
dard. 94 However, citing an earlier decision, 95 the court said that "pro-
mulgation of a separate effluent standard or limitation is not a
prerequisite to enforcement of a permit under [section 402]."
'96
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (1976).
90. 619 F.2d at 631.
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976).
92. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976). This section authorizes the issuance of a National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System permit for the discharge of any pollutant, on condition that the
discharge will meet all applicable requirements of the FWPCA and conditions set by USEPA.
Hereinafter such permit is referred to as an NPDES permit.
93. 619 F.2d at 631.
94. Id.
95. See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 854-55 (7th Cir. 1977).
96. 619 F.2d at 631.
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The court next summarily rejected OMC's argument that the
State's intervention was barred by its recent holding in City of Evans-
ville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc.,97 that the citizen suit authority
in section 505 of the FWPCA "does not provide for suits against parties
alleged to have violated an effluent standard or limitation in the past or
for recovery of damages. '98 The court, finding that the State's appeal
involved current PCB pollution, responded that City of Evansville does
not forbid intervention where violations are of a continuing nature or
may arise in the future.99
The Seventh Circuit's decision in the second appeal in Outboard
Marine is significant in that it appears to be one of first impression for
the interpretation of the FWPCA as allowing state intervention in a
federal enforcement action for violation of an NPDES permit. The
court reached this result, despite the fact that the express language of
section 505 is directed to actions requiring compliance with an effluent
standard or limitation, or an administrative order, rather than to those
involving NPDES permit enforcement. This point was raised on ap-
peal by OMC and rejected by the court. Not only will the decision
stand as precedent for future state efforts to intervene in federal en-
forcement actions, but it will also broaden the scope of section 505 re-
specting intervention by private citizens. Clearly, the decision opens a
new avenue for citizen participation in NPDES permit enforcement ac-
tions.
Lastly, the decision leaves unanswered the question whether state
intervention is permissible in federal actions brought under the federal
common law of nuisance. The government's complaint in Outboard
Marine was founded upon the Refuse Act, the FWPCA, and federal
common law. However, the court of appeals' decision was based exclu-
sively upon its interpretation of the FWPCA as authorizing interven-
tion as a matter of right under its citizen suits provision. The court
declined to consider the two other bases advanced by the government.
Thus, the decision does not speak to intervention in a strictly federal
common law context where the issue, presumably, would be one of per-
missive intervention.
97. 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 689 (1980).
98. Id. at 1014.
99. 619 F.2d at 631.
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REGULATION OF INTRASTATE DREDGE AND FILL ACTIVITIES
United States v. Byrd'°° involved an appeal from an order granting
the plaintiff United States' motion for summary judgment and from the
judgment entered thereon, permanently enjoining defendant Donald
Byrd and two other defendants "from placing any fill or other material
of any kind into the waters of the adjacent or contiguous wetlands of
Lake Wawasee, Indiana" absent a valid dredge and fill permit issued
by the United States Army Corps of Engineers.' 0 ' Only defendant
Byrd appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Corps
could constitutionally exercise its permit-issuing authority over wet-
lands adjacent to intrastate lakes that are used by interstate travelers, 1
0 2
and that the requirement of obtaining a Corps permit did not constitute
a non-compensated taking of property under the fifth amendment.1
0 3
The FWPCA prohibits the discharge into the waters of the United
States of any "pollutant," including dredged soil, rock, sand and cellar
dirt, absent inter alia an appropriate permit. i04 Section 4140 5 autho-
rizes the Corps to issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill ma-
terial. Pursuant to this authority, beginning in 1975, the Corps issued
regulations setting forth a three-stage time schedule for asserting its
permit authority. 10 6 Phase II of that schedule, the only one relevant
here, was to become effective on July 1, 1976. It extended the Corps'
authority to discharges of dredged or fill material into intrastate lakes
used by interstate travelers for water-related recreational purposes and
to fresh-water wetlands adjacent to such lakes.' 0 7 However, the Corps'
permit regulations also included an exception allowing any phase of
the permit program to be advanced in time if the Corps District Engi-
neer determined that water quality considerations dictated such ac-
tion. 108
Byrd owned land bordering Lake Wawasee, a large fresh water
lake used by interstate travelers and seasonal residents for water-re-
lated recreational purposes. Prior to June 15, 1976, he and other lake-
shore landowners engaged in landfill projects to convert swamps
100. 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
101. Hereinafter referred to as the Corps.
102. 609 F.2d at 1210.
103. Id. at 1211.
104. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(6),(7) (1976).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976).
106. The interim final regulations and phase-in schedule were contained in 40 Fed. Reg. 31322
(July 25, 1975), as amended by 41 Fed. Reg. 55524 (December 21, 1976). Its phase-in schedule is
codified at 33 C.F.R. 209.120(e)(2)(i) (1977).
107. See 33 C.F.R. 209.120(d)(2)(i)(g) and (h)(ii)(c) (1977).
108. 33 C.F.R. 209.120(e)(2)(ii) (1977).
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bordering the lake into land suitable for residential development.
These projects were performed without a Corps permit.
Because Byrd and other landowners began to accelerate their fill
projects around Lake Wawasee prior to the effective date of Phase II of
the Corps' regulations, the District Engineer held that the cumulative
effect of their activities would threaten area wildlife and water quality.
He therefore accelerated the Corps' authority over Lake Wawasee and
its wetlands. On June 15, 1976, Byrd was notified to halt work on the
projects until he obtained a Corps dredge and fill permit. Instead, he
continued and on June 24, was notified again. Believing that the Corps
had no jurisdiction until July 1, the original date of the Phase II pro-
gram, he again accelerated his efforts. 10 9 On June 28, 1978, the
Government filed for an injunction in the district court. After the entry
of a preliminary injunction, the Government moved for and was
granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction prohibiting
further landfill activity absent a Corps' permit." l0
On appeal, Byrd argued for the first time that Congress and the
Corps lacked authority under the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution I ' to regulate activities on and around Lake Wawasee, an
in-state body of water, even if the lake were used by interstate travelers
for recreational purposes. Specifically, he challenged "the extension of
federal power to a non-commercial entity which is not included in the
traditional definition of navigable waters which may be controlled by
the federal government."' 12
The Seventh Circuit rejected Byrd's argument, finding first that the
FWPCA defines the term "navigable waters" as meaning "the waters of
the United States, including the territorial seas."'' 3 It next found that
the legislative history of the FWPCA established that Congress desired
to give the term "navigable waters" the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation, and that the term has been held to mean "all the waters
within the geographic confines of the United States."" 4 Given this
congressional intent, the court of appeals went on to note that the Con-
stitution's grant of power to Congress under the commerce clause "has
109. 609 F.2d at 1208.
110. Id.
111. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 grants Congress power to:
[Riegulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.
112. 609 F.2d at 1209.
113. Id, citing FWPCA Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1976).
114. 609 F.2d at 1209, citing United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th
Cir. 1974).
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come to mean that Congress may regulate activities which affect inter-
state commerce,"' 15 particularly if such activities exert a "substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce." 1
6
Based upon this analysis, the Seventh Circuit determined that al-
though Byrd's activities were local, they could potentially exercise a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, 17 in that the de-
struction of the wetlands around Lake Wawasee "could significantly
impair the attraction the lake holds for interstate travelers by degrading
the water quality of the lake, thereby indirectly affecting the flow of
interstate commerce."" 8 The court therefore concluded that under the
commerce clause, Congress could constitutionally extend its regulatory
control of navigable waters to wetlands which adjoin or are contiguous
to intrastate lakes used by interstate travelers for water-related recrea-
tional purposes as defined by the applicable Corps regulation." 19 It fur-
ther found that the Corps regulations were reasonably related to
congressional purpose as expressed in the FWPCA: the restoration and
maintenance of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
United States' waters.'
20
The Seventh Circuit next considered, but rejected, Byrd's argu-
ment that the requirement that he obtain a Corps dredge and fill permit
was tantamount to a taking of his property without just compensation
in violation of the fifth amendment. The court said that a taking may
never occur if Byrd applies for the permit and the Corps issues one.'
2'
It reasoned that if Byrd's permit application were denied, the reasons
would be disclosed, and that judicial relief could be sought at that time,
if appropriate. The court observed that Byrd must first exhaust his ad-
ministrative remedies before the issue may be raised.'
22
The court's opinion in United States v. Byrd is interesting, al-
though not unique, as an illustration of the court's reasoning in apply-
ing federal regulatory authority to purely intrastate activities, in light of
115. 609 F.2d at 1209, citing United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942)
(emphasis in original).
116. 609 F.2d at 1209-10, citing Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 1l, 125 (1942).
117. 609 F.2d at 1210.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1210-11. See 33 U.S.C. §1251(a) (1976). Other courts had reached a similar con-
clusion. See United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Leslie Salt Co. v.
Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 910 (1971); P.F.Z. Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
121. 609 F.2d at 1211.
122. Id.
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somewhat analogous reasoning in Outboard Marine. 123 There, the Sev-
enth Circuit was confronted with a dispute between parties located in
the same state concerning the alleged pollution of a tributary to Lake
Michigan, Waukegan Harbor, and the lake itself. While the court's de-
cision was premised upon the federal common law of nuisance, it relied
heavily upon the FWPCA and its legislative history in construing the
term "navigable waters" to include territorial seas, and purely intra-
state waters and their tributaries.
124
By way of comparison, the Seventh Circuit in Byrd was con-
fronted with dredge and fill activities in wetlands adjacent to a purely
intrastate lake. In applying the Corps' permit authority under the
FWPCA, the court observed again that the term "navigable waters"
was to be interpreted broadly. However, avoiding much of the ex-
tended reasoning involved in Outboard Marine, it simply found that
"navigable waters" means all the waters within the geographic confines
of the United States. Having thus established a federal interest, the
Seventh Circuit turned to Byrd's commerce clause argument, finding
that landfill activity had a "potential" economic effect through impair-
ment, by water quality degradation, of the attraction that the lake held
for interstate travelers.125
CLEAN AIR ACT: ATTAINMENT DESIGNATION PROCESS
United States Steel v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency 26 involved a petition for review of the USEPA's nonattain-
ment designation of certain portions of northern Indiana as not being
in compliance with the national ambient air quality standards, under
the Clean Air Act. 127 The Seventh Circuit denied the petition, rejecting
both substantive and procedural challenges to the designation by peti-
tioners United States Steel Corporation and Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Company, which operated steel works in the affected area.
Section 108(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act' 28 requires USEPA to pub-
lish a list of each common air pollutant which "may reasonably be an-
ticipated to endanger public health or welfare." It must then establish
for each such pollutant national primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards, the attainment and maintenance of which are neces-
123. 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980).
124. See text accompanying notes 64-70 supra.
125. 609 F.2d at 1210.
126. 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 710 (1980).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. 11 1978).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
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sary to protect the public health and welfare. 129 Prior to the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977,130 the states were given primary responsibil-
ity for developing implementation plans to achieve these standards by
1975.131 However, when this deadline proved impossible to meet, Con-
gress in the 1977 Amendments delayed it to 1982132 and established a
combined state and federal implementation process to designate those
geographic areas in which the national ambient air quality standards
were being exceeded for any listed pollutant.133 The designation of an
area within a state as "nonattainment"'' 34 imposes upon the state the
obligation to include in its implementation plan 135 more stringent pro-
visions to achieve the national standards than those required for areas
in which air quality already meets or exceeds the standards. Accord-
ingly, dischargers in areas designated nonattainment may be subject to
greater restraints.
Section 107(d)(1) 136 of the Clean Air Act sets forth the combined
implementation process which requires each state to submit to USEPA
within 120 days of the effective date of the 1977 Amendments that
state's list of the attainment status of all air quality control regions
within its boundaries for each listed air pollutant. Within sixty days
thereafter, USEPA was required to promulgate each such list with
whatever modifications it deemed necessary. 37 Those designations
normally would constitute final agency action.
Pursuant to the foregoing requirements, the State of Indiana sub-
mitted its designation list to USEPA, and USEPA subsequently pub-
lished its own list of attainment designations based upon Indiana's
submissions. In so doing, Indiana listed, and USEPA accepted, the
designation as nonattainment areas of those portions of northern Indi-
ana in which the petitioners operated steel mills. 13 8 Importantly, how-
ever, USEPA, in publishing its designation list, made its designations
effective immediate y, followed by a sixty-day public comment pe-
riod. 139 The petitioners and other interested parties submitted docu-
ments during the comment period. Subsequently, USEPA affirmed its
129. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. 11 1979).
130. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. H 1978).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(I) (Supp. 11 1978).
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. I 1978).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
137. Section 107(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
138. 43 Fed. Reg. 8962 (March 3, 1978).
139. Id.
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designation of the subject areas of northern Indiana as nonattain-
ment.' 4
0
The petitioners first challenged USEPA's promulgation of the
northern Indiana designation on procedural grounds, contending that it
violated the procedural requirements of section 553 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,' 4' which requires notice and commentprior to the
effective date of final agency rules. This contention, however, was re-
jected by the Seventh Circuit on two grounds: (1) USEPA had "good
cause" to "postpone" the required comment period under two specific
exemptions contained in section 553, and (2) the court lacked jurisdic-
tion under the Clean Air Act to reverse for USEPA's alleged procedu-
ral error. 1
42
As to the first ground, the good cause exceptions, the Seventh Cir-
cuit said that section 553 contains two such exceptions which apply
when a regulation is made effective before notice and comment. The
first, section 553(b)(B), allows notice and comment to be dispensed with
altogether, upon an agency finding that "notice and public procedure
thereon are impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to the public inter-
est." ' 43 This, the court characterized as an "impracticality standard"144
and the narrower of the two exemptions. 45 The second exemption,
section 553(d)(3), authorizes dispensing with prior notice and comment
only "as ...provided by the agency for good cause found and pub-
lished with the rule."'
146
USEPA, in publishing its designation list for northern Indiana,
stated, as one of its reasons for making its designations effective imme-
diately, that Congress had established a "tight time schedule on the
designation process" which would be "impractical and contrary to the
public interest to ignore."' 47 However, despite the near identity be-
tween this reason and the requirements of section 553(b)(B), the Sev-
enth Circuit found that the statement "does not reveal on which of the
two [good cause] provisions the agency was relying," and went on to
consider both sections.'
48
Examining the Administrative Procedure Act, the Seventh Circuit
140. 43 Fed. Reg. 46007 (October 5, 1978).
141. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
142. 605 F.2d at 285-86.
143. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1976).
144. 605 F.2d at 287.
145. Id. at 286.
146. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1976).
147. 605 F.2d at 286.
148. Id.
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found a congressional intent for the section 553(b)(B) exemption to op-
erate when regular rulemaking procedures would interfere with con-
gressionally imposed time constraints. 49 The court found that USEPA
and the states were confronted by "tight statutory deadlines" for the
designation process under the Clean Air Act, 50 that the process itself
was very time consuming, and that any delay would continue the "seri-
ously adverse health consequences of nonattainment."' 51 For these
reasons, it held that USEPA had "good cause" under the "impractical-
ity standard" contained in section 553(b)(B) to exempt its designations
from the general requirement of prior notice and comment. 152 In so
doing, however, the court specifically broke with the Third and Fifth
Circuits, which had allowed challenges to the sames general designa-
tion list under similar circumstances. 53
The Seventh Circuit next considered the exemption contained in
section 553(d)(3) which it found to be separate from the first, and
broader in scope, based upon differences in the language of the two
provisions and their legislative histories. 54  Characterizing the
553(d)(3) exemption as requiring a showing of "demonstrable ur-
gency," the court held that the showing had been made based upon its
findings that any delay in USEPA's designation "would run the risk of
delaying the formulation of state implementation plans and the conse-
quent health detriment of delayed nonattainment." 
55
The court's second reason for rejecting the petitioners' procedural
challenges was that the Clean Air Act itself precluded reversal of
USEPA's action. Relying upon section 307(d)(9) of the Act, 156 which
contains specific prerequisites for the reversal of certain forms of ad-
ministrative action on procedural grounds, the court held that none of
149. Id. at 287.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 287-88.
152. Id. at 288-89.
153. Id. at 289 n.l i, citing United States Steel v. EPA, 595 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1979), in which
the Fifth Circuit remanded USEPA's nonattainment designations on the ground that good cause
did not exist for its failure to follow notice and comment procedures under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970); Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979), in
which the Third Circuit left the designations in effect except for the two petitioners in that case.
More recently, in New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the D.C. Circuit joined the
Fifth and Third Circuits in remanding the designations. And, in Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle,
621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980), the Sixth Circuit joined the Seventh in upholding them. Despite the
conflict between the circuits, the Supreme Court already has denied certiorari in the Seventh Cir-
cuit decision, and USEPA is said to be unlikely to seek certiorari in the others because it would be
more efficient to repromulgate the designations.
154. 605 F.2d at 289-90.
155. Id.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (Supp. 11 1978).
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the prerequisites for reversal had been satisfied. 15 7 In so doing, how-
ever, the court had to interpret broadly the specific list of administra-
tive proceedings to which section 307(d)(9) is made applicable, finding
that "[airguably these [nonattainment] designations fit within the sub-
section's application."'
158
The Seventh Circuit next considered, but rejected, the petitioners'
substantive challenge to USEPA's nonattainment designation. The pe-
titioners had argued essentially that the challenged designation was
overbroad geographically, and that its failure to identify a smaller area
was arbitrary and capricious in that it was not supported by an ade-
quate factual basis. The designation was based upon both monitoring
data and modeling studies which the petitioners attacked on several
grounds. The court rejected the contention that USEPA's modeling
studies were outdated, because the record failed to demonstrate any
subsequent improvement in emissions. Furthermore, the petitioners
failed to raise this objection during the comment period on the designa-
tion. 159
The court also rejected the petitioners' own modeling studies, the
gist of which was that other sources were the principal contributors to
the recorded excesses in air quality. 160 It concluded that the air quality
in the affected area did not meet applicable standards, and that this was
sufficient to support the designations regardless of the source of non-
compliance. 161
Finally, the Seventh Circuit rejected the petitioners' contention
that USEPA should have adopted the recommendation of a USEPA
employee, made after reading a United States Steel research study, that
the designated nonattainment area should have been smaller in size.
The court held that the existence of "probable excesses" in air quality
within the designated area, as found by USEPA and conceded by the
particular employee in a report, was sufficient to support the nonattain-
157. 605 F.2d at 291.
158. Id. at 290 n.12. The list, contained in section 307(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(I) (Supp. II
1978), consists of 13 specific forms of proceedings plus the general category of "other actions as
the Administrator may determine." The Seventh Circuit interpreted two of these as necessarily
including nonattainment designations. 605 F.2d at 291 n.12.
159. 605 F.2d at 292.
160. Id. In rejecting this contention, the court relied upon USEPA's interpretation and treat-
ment of the designation process as "defining areas with problematic air quality and not merely
pinpointing those areas which contain problematic sources." Id. at 293. The court said that the
petitioners erroneously viewed the process as defining those areas in which the principal offending
sources are contained. Id. at 292.
161. Id. at 293.
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ment designation. 162
Perhaps the most significant aspect of United States Steel was the
Seventh Circuit's concern for the tight time schedule contained in the
Clean Air Act for attainment designations and state implementation
planning. The court also demonstrated a corresponding concern for
what it found to be the adverse impact on human health of continued
nonattainment. These two factors were expressed repeatedly in its dis-
cussion and rejection of the petitioners' procedural challenges. 1
63
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit demonstrated a clear impatience
with what it perceived to be the petitioners' efforts to block USEPA's
nonattainment designation on procedural grounds. Stating that the
new deadlines contained in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
represented a congressional concern for the "seriously adverse health
impact of continued nonattainment," the court said, "[Ilronically,
much of the congressional concern over delays in meeting ambient air
quality standards was directed at the failure of the petitioners in this
case to reach compliance." 164 In support of this conclusion, the court
excerpted a passage from a House Report on the 1977 Amendments,
65
in which representatives of the steel industry, including one from
United States Steel, testified that none of their plants had achieved
compliance with the emissions limits in nonattainment areas during the
original five-year period set for compliance. The passage ends with the
comment from a representative of Inland Steel Co.: "It sounds terrible.
But these are hard value money expenditures."'
' 66
Anticipating the possibility of at least a further two-year delay in
achieving compliance if the petitioners' procedural challenges were up-
held, the Seventh Circuit said, "Given that the strict deadlines [in the
1977 Amendments] were intended to force compliance by U.S. Steel
and others, we are hesitant to allow U.S. Steel to again delay compli-
162. Id.
163. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in United States Steel was accompanied by a
lengthy dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justices White and Powell
joined. See 100 S. Ct. 710 (1980). For reasons expressed in his dissent, Mr. Justice Rehnquist felt
that the Seventh Circuit grounds for rejecting the petitioners' procedural challenges each "might
merit certiorari in its own right [but] in tandem they present a formidable candidate for review."
Id. at 711. Suggesting that the Supreme Court may be avoiding a complex and uninteresting
issue, he said, "The fact that the requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments virtually swim
before one's eyes is not a rational basis, under these circumstances, for refusing to exercise our
discretionary jurisdiction." Id.
164. 605 F.2d at 287 n.5.
165. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 210-11 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1289.
166. 605 F.2d at 287 n.5.
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ance through its procedural challenges."' 167 While according the peti-
tioners' procedural claims full and careful consideration, the
court characterized them as intended to "continue the procrastination
which Congress sought to end."'' 68 Thus, any future appellant before
the Seventh Circuit whose appeal appears to the court to be designed to
achieve the same end may well expect to find himself subjected to the
same frigid judicial environment.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the Seventh Circuit raised as a
threshold issue in United States Steel, but declined to rule on, the ques-
tion of whether USEPA's action even constituted an exercise of
rulemaking function subject to challenge on procedural grounds under
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 169 Considering the
Act's definition of a "rule" subject to challenge, and its applicable legis-
lative history, the court found that "a designation, such as the one in
this case, that applies solely to a specified, delimited situation" is not a
rule. ' 70 It further likened USEPA's designation of nonattainment areas
to the Secretary of Transportation's designation of areas in parks as
necessary routes for highway construction, the latter having been held
to be "plainly not an exercise of a rulemaking function."' 17 1 Based
upon this analysis, the Seventh Circuit concluded in a footnote that
"the agency's designation of attainment areas would not be subject to
the requirements of section 553"172 of the Act. However, because
USEPA had termed its designations to be rules, the court of appeals
took the position that it need not reach the issue. 1
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CLEAN AIR ACT: STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING PROCESS
Illinois v. USEPA 174 was an action by the State of Illinois for judi-
cial review of a Notice of Deficiency 175 issued by the USEPA in regard
to the Illinois State Implementation Plan 176 under the Clean Air Act. 177
167. Id. (emphasis added). In a final comment on these challenges, the court stated: "We
have already noted the Congressional concern manifest in the Clean Air Act that national attain-
ment be achieved as quickly as practicable. This concern was reflected in the desire that the due
administration of the statutory scheme not be impeded by endless litigation over technical andproce-
dural irregularities." Id. at 290. (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 286 n.5.
169. Id. at 285 n.3.
170. Id.
171. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971).
172. 605 F.2d at 286 n.3.
173. Id.
174. 621 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1980).
175. The Notice appeared at 44 Fed. Reg. 40723 (July 12, 1979), and is set forth in an appen-
dix to the court's opinion.
176. Hereinafter referred to as SIP.
177. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. 11 1978).
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The Notice found deficient those portions of the Illinois SIP, relating to
sulfur dioxide and particulate emissions, that had been vacated by Illi-
nois court action in September 1978. It requested that a SIP revision be
developed or other action taken to correct the deficiencies within sixty
days. The state contended on review that the USEPA had failed to
follow proper rule-making procedures in issuing the Notice, denied
that a SIP deficiency existed, and argued that the Notice was premature
and improper. In the face of agreement of the parties that the Notice
was reviewable under the Clean Air Act, the Seventh Circuit dismissed
the action, finding that it involved no genuine case or controversy.
Section 109 of the Clean Air Act 178 requires USEPA to establish
nationwide primary and secondary ambient air quality standards to
protect the public health and welfare, respectively. Section 110179 re-
quires each state to adopt and submit to USEPA for approval or disap-
proval a SIP which provides for the implementation, maintenance, and
enforcement of both standards. One of the prerequisites of USEPA
approval is that the state have authority to carry out its implementation
plan. 180 In 1972, USEPA substantially approved the Illinois SIP, 181
which consisted in part of state emissions standards for particulate mat-
ter and sulfur dioxide. 182 The standards had been adopted earlier by
the Illinois Pollution Control Board 83 under the Illinois Environmen-
tal Protection Act.
184
Subsequently, litigation developed in the Illinois courts which re-
sulted in the invalidation of the subject state standards. In 1976, the
Illinois Supreme Court held in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution
Control Board185 that the standards had not properly been adopted
under required state procedures. It, therefore, remanded them to the
IPCB with instructions to comply with the required procedures or to
develop substitute regulations. Following this decision, USEPA issued
its first Notice of Deficiency in regard to the standards, in essence re-
questing Illinois to comply with the order of the Illinois Supreme
Court. 1
8 6
In 1977, the IPCB responded by "validating" the subject stan-
178. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. 11 1978).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. 11 1978).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(F)(i) (Supp. 11 1978).
181. 37 Fed. Reg. 10862 (May 31, 1972).
182. 621 F.2d at 263.
183. Hereinafter referred to as IPCB.
184. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111 , §§ 1001-1006 (1979).
185. 62 111. 2d 494, 343 N.E.2d 459 (1976).
186. 41 Fed. Reg. 32302 (August 2, 1976).
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dards. However, in Ashland Chemical Co. v. Pollution Control
Board, 87 that action was challenged and the standards again vacated
on the ground that the IPCB had not followed the instructions of the
Illinois Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison. When the IPCB still
had not adopted new standards by July 5, 1979, USEPA issued its sec-
ond Notice of Deficiency on the theory that, as a result of the state
court decisions, the Illinois SIP was not enforceable. Subsequently, Il-
linois filed its petition for review of this second Notice, thereby initiat-
ing the instant proceeding.
The Seventh Circuit noted in its opinion that both sides agreed
that the Notice of Deficiency was reviewable under section 307(b)(1) of
the Clean Air Act, 188 which authorizes judicial review of certain
USEPA actions. While that section contains a general provision au-
thorizing judicial review of "any other final action of the Administra-
tor," it does not specifically authorize judicial review of Notices of
Deficiency. 189 This led the court to question whether the Notice in-
volved constituted a final agency action subject to judicial review. It
concluded, in essence, that it did not because the issuance of the Notice
was an act preliminary to other required actions under the Act. 190
In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit relied upon the
Supreme Court's opinion in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Wa-
terman Steamshi Corp., 19, for the principle that "administrative orders
are not reviewable unless they impose an obligation, deny a right or fix
some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative proc-
ess."' 192 Applying this principle to Illinois v. USEPA, the Seventh Cir-
cuit analyzed section 110 of the Act' 93 and reviewed the language of
the Notice involved. It concluded that the Notice only informed and
requested that SIP deficiencies be corrected rather than ordered that
corrective action be taken.' 94 In support of this view, the court said
that USEPA "lacks statutory authority to order the state to do anything
about the alleged deficiencies." '' 95 Instead, it found that under section
187. 64 111. App. 3d 169, 381 N.E.2d 56 (1978).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
189. The Seventh Circuit noted that the term "Notice of Deficiency" does not appear in the
Clean Air Act in connection with the provision that "notification" be given to a state for a defi-
ciency in its SIP. Rather, it found that the term had been fashioned by USEPA to implement the
notification requirement. 621 F.2d at 261.
190. Id.
191. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
192. Id. at 112-13.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1976).
194. 621 F.2d at 261.
195. Id.
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110 the burden shifts to USEPA to develop an adequate SIP if a state
submits an inadequate one. Consequently, the court found that a No-
tice of Deficiency is "only one step in an extended administrative proc-
ess."1
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The Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Illinois v. USEPA, although
implicit in its opinion, was not expressly stated. This typified the opin-
ion which lacks a clear conclusion, contains expressions of doubts and
qualifications, and leaves one wondering whether the court was entirely
certain of its own reasoning. Having decided the case on a purely juris-
dictional point, the court demonstrated a nagging concern for the mer-
its of the arguments that the parties sought to have adjudicated relative
to the Notice of Deficiency. Thus, the impact of the opinion and its
precedential value as a case of apparent first impression are lessened
considerably. Lastly, the court indicated that the case itself was not
sufficiently important to decide, thus leaving the impression that had
the same issue been presented in a more attractive factual setting, the
issue might have been decided.
CONCLUSION
The 1979-80 term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was marked by several substantial decisions in the en-
vironmental area. Its opinions in City of Evansville and Outboard
Marine may be expected to have landmark significance in expanding
the federal common law of nuisance governing pollution in terms of
parties and issues. The further development of that doctrine may well
encroach on administratively set standards and limitations. The Sev-
enth Circuit's decision in United States Steel departs from those of at
least three other courts of appeals in upholding a USEPA nonattain-
ment designation as against alleged procedural irregularities. More-
over, the Court's comments in United States Steel as to what it viewed
as a continual effort by industry to delay compliance with Clean Air
Act requirements should constitute a clear warning of a hardening ju-
dicial attitude with regard to such procrastination. The court's opinion
in the second appeal in Outboard Marine also was significant for al-
lowing state intervention in a federal permit enforcement action. Its
decisions in Byrd and Illinois v. USEPA were interesting, if not signifi-
cant, the latter being a case of apparent first impression.
196. ld.
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Review of the court's environmental opinions for its 1979-80 term
demonstrates a careful concern for what is fast becoming one of the
most complex areas of the law.

